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Practitioners and most academics in valuation include changes in liquid assets 
(potential dividends) in the cash flows. This widespread and wrong practice is 
inconsistent with basic finance theory. We present economic, theoretical, and 
empirical arguments to support the thesis. Economic arguments underline 
that only flows of cash should be considered for valuation; theoretical argu-
ments show how potential dividends lead to contradiction and to arbitrage 
losses. Empirical arguments, from recent studies, suggest that investors 
discount potential dividends with high discount rates, which means that 
changes in liquid assets are not value drivers. Hence, when valuing cash 
flows, we should consider only actual payments. 
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Cash flow to equity, potential dividends, equity value.
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2%35-%.
Dividendos potenciales y flujos 
de caja reales en valoración. Un 
análisis crítico.
Profesionales y la mayoría de los 
académicos de valoración incluyen 
los cambios en activos líquidos (divi-
dendos potenciales) en los flujos de 
efectivo. Esta práctica generalizada 
y equivocada es incompatible con la 
teoría básica de finanzas. Se presen-
tan argumentos económicos, teóricos 
y empíricos para apoyar esta tesis. 
Los argumentos económicos dicen 
que para la valoración sólo se deben 
considerar flujos de caja; los teóri-
cos muestran cómo los dividendos 
potenciales conducen a contradic-
ciones y a pérdidas de arbitraje. Los 
argumentos empíricos sugieren que 
los inversionistas descuentan los di-
videndos potenciales con altas tasas 
de descuento, lo que significa que el 
cambio en activos líquidos destruyen 
valor. Por tanto, al valorar los flujos 
de caja, se debería considerar sólo los 
pagos que en realidad ocurren.
0!,!"2!3 #,!6%
Flujo de caja del accionista, dividen-
dos potenciales, valor del patrimo-
nio.
 
2%35-/ 
Potenciais dividendos e fluxo de 
caixa efetivo em valoração de pa-
trimônio. Uma análise crítica
Profissionais e a maioria dos acadé-
micos trabalhando no campo da va-
loração incluem mudanças em ativos 
disponíveis (potenciais dividendos) 
nos fluxos de caixa. Esta prática co-
mum e incorreta é inconsistente com 
a teoria financeira básica. Nós apre-
sentamos argumentos econômicos, 
teóricos e empíricos para apoiar essa 
tese. Enquanto que os argumentos 
econômicos afirmam que apenas os 
fluxos de caixa deveriam ser conside-
rados para objetivos de valoração, os 
argumentos teóricos mostram como a 
consideração de potenciais dividendos 
leva a contradições/discrepâncias e 
perdas em arbitragem. Argumentos 
empíricos em estudos recentes su-
gerem que os investidores tendem 
a descontar potenciais dividendos 
a elevadas taxas de desconto, o que 
significa que as mudanças em ativos 
disponíveis não são acionadores de 
valor. Por isso, apenas pagamentos 
reais deveriam ser considerados ao 
valorar fluxos de caixa.
0!,!62!3#(!6%
Fluxo de caixa para valoração, po-
tenciais dividendos, valoração de 
patrimônio.
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In this document, we give support 
to the idea that potential dividends 
that are not distributed (and are 
invested in liquid assets) should be 
neglected in firm valuation, because 
only distributed cash flows add value 
to shareholders. Hence, the definition 
of Cash Flow to Equity should include 
only the cash flow that is actually 
paid to shareholders (dividends paid 
plus share repurchases minus new 
equity investment). Although some 
authors warn against the use of po-
tential dividends for valuing firms 
(DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 2006, 2007; 
Fernández, 2002, 2007; Tham and 
Vélez-Pareja, 2004; Vélez-Pareja, 
1999a, 1999b, 2004, 2005a, 2005b); 
some respected authors (e.g. Ben-
ninga and Sarig, 1997; Brealey and 
Myers, 2003; Copeland,2 Koller and 
Murrin, 1994, 2000; Damodaran, 
1999, 2006a, 2006b, 2008) and many 
practitioners seem to support the 
idea that the Cash Flow to Equity 
has to include undistributed potential 
dividends.3 
To include undistributed potential 
dividends in valuation is admissible 
only if they are expected to be in-
vested at the cost of equity capital, 
ke, i.e. the net present value (NPV) 
of those investments is zero from the 
point of view of current sharehold-
ers. If the latter assumption held, 
then changes in liquid assets could 
be indeed included in the Cash Flow 
to Equity, because they would be 
value-neutral (DeAngelo and DeAn-
gelo, 2006; Magni, 2007). It should 
be noted that a definition of cash flow 
to equity is meant to be valid for all 
possible cases, and thus should not 
depend on a particular assumption 
about investment in liquid assets, 
otherwise the consequent definition 
of firm value would depend on a 
particular assumption about invest-
ment in liquid assets. Furthermore, 
this particular assumption violates 
Jensen’s (1986) agency theory. DeAn-
gelo and DeAngelo (2006) claim that 
“When MM’s assumptions are relaxed 
to allow retention, payout policy 
matters in exactly the same sense 
that investment policy does” (p. 293) 
and “irrelevance fails because some 
feasible payout policies do not dis-
tribute the full present value of FCF 
to currently outstanding shares” (p. 
294). The zero-NPV assumption is 
not supported by the empirical data. 
Literature reports that holding liquid 
assets destroys value or at most does 
not create a significant amount of 
value. Schwetzler and Carsten (2003) 
report that in Germany “persistent 
excessive cash holdings lead to a sig-
nificant operating underperformance 
[italics added] (…) in line with expec-
tations of the agency theory” (p. 25). 
Harford (1999)4 finds that “cash-rich 
bidder destroys seven cents of firm 
value [italics added] for every dollar 
of excess cash held” (p. 1983) and 
2 Professor Tom Copeland in a private correspondence says (August 8, 2004): “If funds are kept within the 
firm you still own them -- hence ‘potential dividends’ are cash flow available to shareholders, whether or 
not they are paid out now or in the future.” 
3 The authors we analyze (Damodaran, Copeland, etc.) do not give a clear and unambiguous definition of 
cash flow to equity/potential dividends.
4 Quotations from this author are taken from the SSRN, version 1997.
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says that “the stock market appears 
to partially anticipate this behavior, 
as evidenced by the negative stock 
market reaction to cash stockpiling 
[italics added]” (p. 1972). Finally, 
he says that “one might expect that 
stockpiling cash would be greeted 
negatively by the market [italics 
added]” (p. 1992). Opler, Pinkowitz, 
Stulz and Williamson (1999) say that 
“holdings of liquid assets can make 
shareholders worse off [italics added] 
in some circumstances” (p. 2) and “In 
a world of perfect capital markets 
[italics added], holdings of liquid 
assets are irrelevant. If cash flow 
turns out to be unexpectedly low so 
that a firm has to raise funds to keep 
operating and invest, it can do so at 
zero cost. (…) Hence, if a firm borrows 
money and invests it in liquid assets, 
shareholders wealth is unchanged” 
(pp. 4-5). Finally, they write that 
“investing in cash can therefore have 
an adverse effect on firm value. To 
put it another way, increasing firm’s 
holdings of liquid assets by one dol-
lar may increase firm value by less 
than one dollar [italics added]” (p. 
11). Faulkender and Wang (2004) 
find “that the marginal value of cash 
declines with larger cash holdings 
[italics added], higher leverage, bet-
ter access to capital markets, and as 
firms choose to distribute cash via 
dividends rather than repurchases” 
(p. 2) and they “estimate that for the 
mean firm-year in the sample, the 
marginal value of cash is $0,96 [ital-
ics added]” (p. 24). 
On the other hand, Mikkelson and 
Partch (2003) conclude that “per-
sistent large holdings of cash and 
equivalents have not hindered cor-
porate performance” (p. 2), and that 
“there is no evidence that large firms 
with lower insider stock ownership, 
higher inside board composition, or 
a controlling founder perform differ-
ently than other large cash firms” (p. 
20). Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson 
(2003) write: “Strikingly, while a dol-
lar of cash is worth roughly a dollar 
of firm value [italics added] in the 
U.S., in countries with poor institu-
tions, a dollar of cash is consistently 
estimated to be worth less than 65 
cents [italics added]” (p. 6). 
In addition, Pinkowitz, Williamson 
and Stulz (2007)’s result point out 
that one dollar of increase in divi-
dends creates about ten dollars in 
value while one dollar increase in 
cash creates about 29 cents of value 
for countries with poor shareholders 
rights countries. In high corrup-
tion countries one dollar increase 
in dividends creates more than 6,50 
dollars of value and one dollar of 
cash and cash equivalent create 33 
cents of value. In the non corrupt 
countries and with good protection to 
the shareholders one dollar of extra 
dividends creates near four dollars in 
value and one dollar in liquid assets 
creates about one dollar in value. On 
the other hand, Pinkowitz and Wil-
liamson (2002) report that, on the 
average, one dollar in cash is 1,25 
dollars worth in value.
This article aims at reinforcing the 
arguments on the inconvenience of 
adding the change in liquid assets 
(undistributed potential dividends) 
as part of the cash flows to be used for 
firm valuation. The arguments used 
in this document to support our thesis 
are of three types: economic, logical, 
and empirical.
As for the economic reasons, they 
highlight that to include the change 
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in liquid assets in the definition of 
Cash Flow to Equity means: (i) to con-
found stock with flows, (ii) to adopt 
the very particular assumption that 
the full present value of liquid assets 
(computed at the cost of equity) will 
be distributed to shareholders, (iii) to 
break consistency between cash flow 
and financial statements, (iv) to dis-
tort taxes, and (v) to refuse Jensen’s 
(1986) agency theory which implies 
that firms in real life tend to retain 
funds and invest them in low-return 
investments.
As for the logical arguments, we pro-
vide three formal proofs to show that 
a rational evaluator does not use un-
distributed potential dividends. The 
first proof relies on incompatibility of 
CAPM and the use of potential divi-
dends for valuation. The second one 
shows the use of potential dividends 
is incompatible with the classical 
valuation theory (and therefore, with 
Modigliani and Miller’s approach). 
A third proof shows that investors 
including changes in liquid assets 
as value-creation factors fall prey to 
arbitrage losses. 
As for the empirical argument, we 
analyze and work out some contribu-
tions in the recent literature, from 
which it can be inferred that inves-
tors value liquid assets much less 
than dividends. Also, the implicit 
discount rates for liquid assets are 
very high, which suggests that inves-
tors do not consider liquid assets as 
affecting a firm’s value. 
The document is organized as follows: 
section 1 shows that our definition 
of Cash Flow to Equity as dividends 
minus net capital contributions 
is consistent with basic finance, 
and, in particular, with Modigliani 
and Miller’s approach to valuation, 
whereas the definition widely used in 
many applied corporate finance text-
books and in real-life applications is 
not; this section also summarizes the 
different views advocated by several 
authors. Section 2 furnishes several 
economic reasons for supporting our 
thesis. Section 3 illustrates three logi-
cal arguments, and section 4 makes 
use of findings and information col-
lected and analyzed by Pinkowitz et 
al. (2007) and other scholars to find 
indications of the irrelevance of liq-
uid assets in value creation. Section 
5 proposes a (theoretically correct) 
model to test the hypothesis that 
changes in liquid assets do not add 
value: the model proposed will be 
used in future researches. Some re-
marks conclude the document (main 
notational conventions are collected 
at the end of the document).
  $%&).)4)/.3	 /& #!3( 
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This section proposes a definition of 
Cash Flow to Equity consistent with 
Modigliani and Miller’s (1958, 1963) 
and Miller and Modigliani’s (1961) 
approach to valuation. 
According to the well known Clean 
Surplus Relation, change in equity 
book value is equal to change in capi-
tal stock plus net income (NI) minus 
dividends paid to shareholders (Div) 
as in eq. (1)
1111  y tttttt DivNICSCSEBVEBV  (1)
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where EBV is the equity book value, 
and CSt+1 is the capital stock con-
tributed by shareholders up to time 
t+1. 
We use “d”,5 as the variation symbol, 
hence, dEBVt+1 = EBVt+1 –EBVt is 
the change in equity book value and 
dCSt+1 = CSt+1 – CSt is the net capital 
contributions made by shareholders 
in the year (i.e. dCSt+1 = new equity 
investment – shares repurchases). 
Therefore, we may rewrite equation 
(1) as:
)( 1111   tttt dCSDivNIdEBV (2)
This is the cash flow that adds value 
to the equity. We define cash flow to 
equity (CFE) as:
           111   ttt dCSDivCFE       (3)
As said above, our notion of CFE in 
eq. (3) is exactly what Miller and 
Modigliani (1961) use to calculate 
the firm value: their eq. (17) at p. 419 
underscore the difference between 
dividends paid and net capital con-
tributions. Using our symbols, the 
Miller and Modigliani’s formula is 
]E)dCS[(Div
R)( ttt
Et 1111
1
 
  (4)
where Et is the equity market value at time t (and ρ is Miller and Modigliani’s 
symbol for the cost of equity capital). 
It is worth noting that Miller and 
Modigliani propose the (equivalent) 
stream of earnings approach to valu-
ation. Their eq. (9) is as follows:
          ¤
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Inspecting the numerator, the reader 
may note that our eqs. (2) and (3) 
just imply, CFEt+1 = NIt+1 – dEBVt+1 
so that:
        ; =¤
d


 
0
1
10 1
t
t
t p)/(CFEE
As a consequence, our approach is 
consistent with Miller and Modi-
gliani’s approach. By contrast, a 
large part of practitioners and some 
corporate finance scholars propose 
a different definition. For example, 
Damodaran (1999, 2006a, 2006b) 
proposes the use of cash flow avail-
able for distribution for valuing a 
firm’s equity, even if it will not be 
paid to the equity holder. The cash 
available for distribution is usually 
called “potential dividends”; the part 
of it which is not actually distributed 
is invested in liquid assets, i.e. cash 
and short-term investments such 
as market securities, certificate of 
deposit, CD, etc. Damodaran’s defini-
tion of cash flow to equity, which is 
widely adopted in applied corporate 
finance textbooks and practice, may 
be formalized as follows:
)1t(pot1t1t DivCFE*CFE    (6)
where Div pot(t+1) denote undistributed 
potential dividends. The latter are 
defined as the increase in liquid as-
sets: 
              1)1(   ttpot dLADiv             (7)
with LAt+1 = Ct+1 + STIt+1 (C=cash, 
STI=short-term investments).
We can express it in different terms: 
we divide the assets of the firm into 
two categories: fixed assets net of 
cumulated depreciation (NFA) and 
working capital (WC), defined as 
current assets (cash + short term 
5 Henceforth, change in a variable y is defined as: dyt+1 = yt+1 – yt 
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investments + accounts receivable + 
inventories) minus current liabilities 
(accounts payable): 
111111   tttttt APInvARSTICWC
Then,
      1111   tttt DWCNFAEBV   (9)
where D is the book value of the 
debt. From eq. (9), dEBVt+1 = dNFAt+1 
+ dWCt+1 – dDt+1. Hence, making 
use of eqs. (2)-(3), CFE may also be 
computed with the so-called indirect 
method:
)( 11111   ttttt dDdWCdNFANICFE
where Investment in dNFAt+1 = 
NFAt+1 – NFAt = Fixed Assetst+1 –De-
preciationt+1, and represents the so-
called net capital expenditure.6
By contrast, a frequent definition in 
textbooks turns out to be:
)(
*
1111
1


 t
nc
ttt
t
dDdWCdNFANI
CFE
with WCnc being noncash (operating) 
working capital:
             111   tt
nc
t LAWCWC        (12)
so that dARt+1 + dInvt+1 – dAPt+1 = 
dWCnc  (see, for example, Damodaran, 
1999, p. 128; Damodaran, 2006a, p. 
79). In eq. (10) working capital is 
inclusive of undistributed potential 
dividends dLAt+1, whereas in eq. (11) 
working capital excludes dLAt+1. That 
is why the term in parenthesis in 
(8)
(10)
eq. (10) is greater than the term in 
parenthesis in eq. (11). As a result, 
is smaller than CFE*.
Damodaran (2006b) acknowledges 
the valuation deviations derived from 
using potential dividends rather than 
actual cash flows. He appropriately 
observes that 
when the FCFE is greater than the 
dividend and the excess cash either 
earns below-market interest rates or 
is invested in negative net present 
value assets, the value from the FCFE 
model will be greater than the value 
from the dividend discount model 
(p. 24). 
And he admits that there is reason to 
believe that this is not as unusual as 
it would seem at the outset (p. 24). 
Nevertheless, in his textbooks and 
documents he seems to contradict his 
very arguments, given that he favors 
the potential-dividends model over 
the other ones:
Actual dividends (…) may be much 
lower than the potential dividends 
(that could have been paid out) (…) 
When actual dividends are less than 
potential dividends, using a model 
that focuses only on dividends will un-
der state the true value [italics added] 
of the equity in a firm. (Damodaran, 
2008, lide 106)
(…) firms do not always pay out what 
they can afford to in dividends. A more 
realistic estimate of equity value may 
require us to estimate the potential 
dividend—the cash flow that could 
have been paid out as a dividend. 
(Damodaran, 2006a, p. 111)
6 Eqs. (9)-(10) may obviously be written as:
 CFEt+1 = NIt+1 + Depreciationt+1 – Investment in fixed assetst+1  –  dWCt+1  – dDt+1
 CFEt+1 = NIt+1 + Depreciationt+1 – Investment in fixed assetst+1  –  dWCt+1  – dDt+1
(11)
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Obviously, the fact that firms do not 
pay out what they have available for 
distribution is not a good reason for 
favoring potential dividends as op-
posed to actual cash flow. Quite the 
contrary, if firms do not pay out cash 
flows that is available, then value is 
affected; in principle, whatever the 
magnitude of potential dividends, if a 
firm pays out no dividend over the life 
of the firm, the equity’s value is zero, 
as Miller and Modigliani correctly 
recognize (1961, p. 419, footnote 12). 
And this is true even if the company 
has invested in positive NPV projects 
(see also DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 
2006).
Benninga and Sarig (1997) share 
Damodaran’s view: 
Free Cash Flow (FCF) [is] a concept 
that defines the amount of cash that 
the firm can [italics added] distribute 
to security holders (…) Cash and 
marketable securities are the best 
example of working capital items 
that we exclude from our definition 
of [change in net working capital], 
as they are the firm’s stock of excess 
liquidity adjustment. (p. 36) 
When calculating free cash flow (and 
cash flow to equity) these authors do 
not subtract dLAt+1, which entails 
that they abide by eq. (11) above (they 
make use of the term “net working 
capital” while meaning “operating 
net working capital”, exclusive of 
change in liquid assets). If changes in 
liquid assets are not included in the 
working capital, then any increase 
in liquid assets is not listed as a 
reduction in the cash available (as 
is correctly done in eq. (10)), even if 
they are deposited in the bank or in 
an investment fund. Using the funds 
(a cash excess) for increasing liquid 
assets reduces the cash available for 
distribution; if that is not listed in the 
calculation of FCF, then the increase 
appears to be an amount available 
for distribution even if it is not, and 
hence the cash flows to investors 
(FCF or CFE) are overstated, as well 
as the consequent firm value. 
Copeland, Koller and Murrin’s (1990, 
1994, 2000) definition of free cash 
flow is consistent with Damodaran’s 
and Benninga and Sarig’s: they define 
it as “gross cash flow (NOPLAT plus 
depreciation) minus gross investment 
(increases in working capital plus 
capital expenditures)” (Copeland et 
al., 2000, p. 138). Like with Benninga 
and Sarig, they employ the expres-
sion “working capital” but refer to 
“operating working capital”, as they 
explicitly state at p. 168. As a conse-
quence, their definition of cash flow to 
equity does not exclude undistributed 
potential dividends:
Cash flow to equity = Dividends 
paid + Potential Dividends +Equity 
repurchases – Equity Issues
(see, for example, Copeland et al., 
1994, p. 480, Exhibit 16.3; Copeland 
et al., 2000, Exhibit 21.2 at p. 430 and 
Exhibit 21.10 at p. 438). Admittedly, 
in the first edition of their book (Co-
peland et al., 1990) they seemed to be 
inclined to accept a strict definition 
of cash flow to equity as cash flow 
paid to shareholders: in their Exhibit 
13.2 at p. 379 one finds, referred to 
equity,
Free Cash Flow = Dividends to 
equity
and  they explicitly refer to “free cash 
flow to shareholders, which is math-
ematically identical to dividends” (p. 
379). Yet, from the second edition 
of their book a radical shift toward 
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potential dividends is consummated, 
albeit with no justification.
Brealey and Myers (2003) write that 
“free cash flow is the amount of cash 
that a firm can pay out to investors 
after paying for all investments nec-
essary for growth” (p. 75). Therefore, 
while not being explicit, they seem to 
share the above mentioned authors’ 
point of view. Their notion of work-
ing capital is consistent with the 
above mentioned authors, who do not 
subtract the change in liquid assets: 
“Working capital summarizes the 
net investment in short-term assets 
associated with a firm, business or 
project (...) Working capital = inven-
tory + accounts receivable – accounts 
payable.” (p. 126)7
While the practice of using potential 
dividends rather for valuing firms 
is a widespread one, there are some 
authors who consider it an error and 
correctly use only actual payments to 
shareholders for defining cash flow 
to equity. For example, Fernández 
(2002, p. 171) clearly states that “the 
forecast equity cash flow in a period 
must be equal to forecast dividends 
plus share repurchases in that pe-
riod” and “the ECF in a period is the 
increase in cash (above the minimum 
cash, whose increase is included in 
the increase in WCR) during that 
period, before dividend payments, 
share repurchases and capital in-
creases” (p. 172); “considering the 
cash in the company as an equity cash 
flow when the company has no plans 
to distribute it” (Fernández, 2007, 
p. 26) is a frequent error in real-life 
applications. 
DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2007) argue 
that a firm’s equity is not given by 
potential dividends but by cash flow 
paid to shareholders. The former 
(they label them “free cash flow”) 
determines the investment value, the 
latter leads to the distribution value: 
“Investment value is the discounted 
value of the FCF to the firm generated 
by its investment policy, which de-
termines the firm’s capacity to make 
payouts. Distribution value is the 
discounted value of the cash payouts 
to currently outstanding shares, i.e., 
the cash flow paid to stockholders, 
which determines the market value 
of equity” (p. 16, italics in original). 
They underline that “value is gener-
ated for investors only to the extent 
that this capacity is transformed into 
actual payouts” (DeAngelo and DeAn-
gelo, 2006, p. 309, italics added). 
Our stance is that nomina sunt 
omina:8 cash flow is a flow of cash and 
therefore: (i) stock items in the bal-
ance sheet should not be considered 
flows, and (ii) changes in stock items 
should be considered flow of cash only 
if they are paid to (or received from) 
shareholders. Hence, our definition of 
CFE as dividends minus net capital 
contributions (see eq. (3) above). If 
management keeps cash holdings 
instead of distributing it, shareholder 
wealth is affected unless the unpaid 
cash is invested in zero-NPV projects 
7 It is worth noting that the definition of potential dividend is ambiguous in corporate finance textbook, 
because ordinary language and numerical examples are used instead of rigorous formalism, and there is 
no standard terminology across writers, so increasing problems of understanding.
8 This Latin sentence means “names indicate what they mean”.
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and distributed to shareholders over 
the life of the enterprise. But, usually 
in real life, as empirical evidence sug-
gests, keeping cash holdings destroys 
value: the NPV of those invested 
funds is not zero (below zero).
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This section summarizes economic 
and financial reasons for including 
in the cash flow only what indeed is 
a flow of cash.
Cash flows and stocks. To consider 
as cash flow items that are listed in 
the balance sheet is to deny the basic 
concept in valuation: cash flows. And 
they are just that, flows of money, 
whereas items in the balance sheet 
are stocks. It is a contradiction to say 
that an item is at the same time a line 
(or part of it) in the balance sheet and 
a line in the cash flow. Furthermore, 
if one considered cash flow what it is 
such only potentially, then one should 
consistently consider any asset in the 
firm as potential dividends, because 
assets may be sold and the cash may 
be distributed to investors: but then 
one should consider assets in the firm 
as representing both stocks and flows, 
which is a contradiction.
Modigliani and Miller’s approach. 
Modigliani and Miller’s (1958, 1963) 
approach to firm valuation only takes 
account of cash flows paid to inves-
tors. There are no potential dividends 
in their articles. The same is true 
even in Miller and Modigliani (1961) 
where the irrelevance of dividends 
is proved. As DeAngelo and DeAn-
gelo (2006) underline, in Miller and 
Modigliani’s 1961 paper there are 
no retained funds, and the assump-
tion is “to mandate 100% free cash 
flow payout in every period” (p. 293). 
Miller and Modigliani do not deal 
with potential dividends retained 
in the firms and invested in liquid 
assets. There are no investments in 
liquid assets in Miller and Modigliani 
(1961). Miller and Modigliani’s thesis 
may be extended to the case of reten-
tion of FCF only if that investment 
is made at the opportunity cost of 
equity and “provided that manag-
ers distribute the full present value 
of FCF” (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 
2006, p. 303. See also Magni, 2007). 
Therefore, it is true that the unpaid 
dividends will be distributed at the 
terminal date, so that their value is 
captured in the terminal or continu-
ing value. But it is never sufficiently 
stressed that irrelevance holds if and 
only if, a perfect market exists where 
cash excess not paid is invested at 
the opportunity cost of equity. In 
real life, excess cash is invested in 
liquid assets at some available rate 
that might be greater, equal or lower 
than the cost of equity. This means 
that the NPV of those undistributed 
funds can be greater, equal or less 
than zero.
Consistency between cash flows 
and financial statements. There 
should be a complete consistency 
between cash flows and financial 
statements. If one says that every 
dollar available belongs to the equity 
holders, then that fact should be 
reflected in the financial statement. 
That is, those funds should appear as 
effectively distributed. In a valuation 
where a finite planning horizon is 
considered, decisions on what to do 
with excess cash are reflected in the 
financial model. This implies that 
if management foresees to invest 
in marketable securities, that deci-
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sion should appear in the financial 
statements. On the other hand, if 
cash holdings are invested in addi-
tional operating assets, that decision 
should be included in the analysis; if 
they are devoted to acquisitions or 
buyouts, again, that decision should 
be reflected in the cash flows with 
all the financial implications it has. 
After this finite planning horizon, one 
makes the assumption that all avail-
able cash is distributed to equity and 
debt holders; the finite planning hori-
zon should cover the largest possible 
period and at the end, a continuing 
or terminal value should measure the 
value generated for perpetuity. 
Tax distortion. When one includes 
in the CFE the excess cash invested 
in liquid assets, one does distort 
taxes. Instead of recording an explicit 
return (usually a low return) that is 
taxed and listed in the income state-
ment, one creates a virtual return 
equivalent to the cost of equity, ke, 
which is not taxed in reality. Here, 
by virtual return we mean the return 
obtained implicitly when we distrib-
ute the cash flow to the owners (the 
debt and equity holders). This virtual 
and “automatic” return is one of the 
assumptions when we discount cash 
flows, as was recognized decades 
ago (see Lorie and Savage, 1955). 
When we assume that funds that 
are invested at a rate usually lower 
than the discount rate are part of the 
cash flow, we are assuming implicitly 
that those flows are reinvested at the 
same discount rate, but those returns 
are not listed in the income statement 
and not taxed, and go directly to the 
pocket of the owners. Here, it is im-
portant to take into account of this: 
cash flows for valuation are what goes 
out from the firm and is paid to the 
capital owners (debt and equity hold-
ers). When that cash flow is received 
by them, it is assumed that they 
invest those funds at their respective 
rates of return (cost of equity, ke). The 
problem arises when the firm does 
not pay out the cash flow and invests 
it in liquid assets. If the amounts ap-
pear in the cash flows, then it is “as if” 
the equity holder had received them, 
but in fact she has not, and when one 
discounts the cash flows at the cost 
of equity or at WACC, one is assum-
ing that the investor is reinvesting 
it at the opportunity cost of equity 
rate, but it does not happen in reality 
because she has not received them 
(the funds are invested in cash and/or 
in marketable securities). It might 
sound paradoxical,9 but, actually, the 
greater the cash flow drawn out by 
debt and equity holders, the greater 
the firm’s value. The value of the firm 
is not in the funds that remain inside 
the firm, but in the funds that go out. 
Firm value increases if and only if 
cash is actually pulled out from the 
firm and distributed to the owners of 
debt or equity. Therefore, to consider 
potential dividends as actually pulled 
out by the firm is like trying to pull 
potential rabbits out of actual hats.
Zero-NPV assumption in real-life 
applications. One argument often 
used to justify the inclusion of cash 
holdings as a cash flow is that: the net 
present value of those investments is 
zero. We might agree on this assump-
9 Intuitively, people think of cash flows as net cash after adding inflows and subtracting all inflows. But 
inflows for capital providers are outflows for the firm.
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tion as a conservative approach to 
avoid excessive optimism as well as 
the determination (in a forecast) of 
a very high return on those invested 
funds. However, in constructing pro 
forma financial statements (forecast-
ing) one should look the history of 
the firm and estimate the historical 
returns on those funds, and forecast 
them accordingly to the historical av-
erage return. If the forecasted return 
is lower than the discount rate of the 
cash flows, the effect is that there is 
a destruction of value. If higher, a 
creation of value occurs. The idea of 
assuming without question that the 
NPV of the investment in market se-
curities is zero implies that whatever 
the analyst or the management will 
do with those funds are of no concern 
to investors, because their funds do 
not contribute to value creation (they 
are value-neutral). Then, a simple 
conclusion could be drawn if one ac-
cepted the idea that the investment 
of cash excess does not affect the 
firm value: whether one keeps it in 
the safe box, in the bank, invested 
in an investment fund or whatever 
else, it will make no difference be-
cause the NPV is zero. This should 
lead many people and institutions 
to refrain from offering solutions for 
cash management purposes, such as 
the following.
No financial discipline is more im-
portant and yet more overlooked and 
misunderstood than the essential 
principles and practices of corporate 
cash and liquidity management. Any 
business’ success – from its long-term 
prospects to its short-term stabil-
ity – depends on smart, efficient, 
and creative cash management 
solutions for handling cash inflows 
and outflows. The lesson is simple: 
Those companies that handle cash 
best thrive most (Cash Management 
Fundamentals, 2007).
A shareholder would not accept 
to be virtually paid with potential 
dividends that never go to her 
pocket; similarly, banks or, in gen-
eral, debt holders would not accept 
that interest or principal payments 
should be paid with potential inter-
est and principal payments. Will 
practitioners and teachers accept 
an invitation to tell their customers 
and students to disregard the impor-
tance of cash management? Will they 
spread the idea that keeping the ex-
cess cash in the bank account (with 
no interest) would mean the same 
in terms of value than investing it 
wisely? Obviously not. If managers 
do not or are not expected to fully 
distribute the cash available, one 
should not “create” cash flow where 
it is not. Certainly, there should be 
ways to avoid that managers waste 
the excess cash in bad investments. 
Jensen (1986) says it in a rather 
graphical manner: “The positive 
market response to debt in oil indus-
try takeovers (…) is consistent with 
that additional debt increases effi-
ciency by forcing organizations with 
large cash flows but few high-return 
investment projects to disgorge cash 
to investors. The debt helps prevent 
such firms from wasting resources 
on low-return projects” (pp. 10-11). 
Further, he writes that “Free cash 
flow is cash flow in excess of that re-
quired to fund all projects that have 
positive net present values when 
discounted at the relevant cost of 
capital. Conflicts of interest between 
shareholders and managers over 
payout policies are especially severe 
when the organization generates sub-
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stantial free cash flow. The problem is 
how to motivate managers to disgorge 
the cash rather than investing it at 
below the cost of capital or wasting it 
on organization inefficiencies” (p. 2) 
and “Managers with substantial free 
cash flow can increase dividends or 
repurchase stock and thereby pay out 
current cash that would otherwise 
be invested in low-return projects or 
wasted” (p. 3). Therefore, although 
corporate financial theory may con-
veniently employ the assumption of 
full distribution of cash generated, 
in practice this does not happen, as 
Jensen underlines, so there is a need 
for distinguishing between potential 
cash flow available for distribution 
and actual cash flow effectively paid 
out to equity and debt holders.10 The 
excess cash that managers refuse 
to pay to equity holders should not 
be included in the effective (actual) 
distributed cash flow. The fact that 
in theory firms should distribute the 
available cash does not imply that 
the analyst should assume that in 
the future all available cash will be 
distributed, if historically the firm 
has not distributed it. To assume that 
cash holdings are a cash flow that 
creates value is counter to evidence: 
“the theory is empirically refutable, 
predicting that firms will distribute 
the full PV of FCF, an implication 
that differentiates it from Jensen’s 
(1986) agency theory” (DeAngelo and 
DeAngelo, 2006, p. 295).
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In this section we formalize three 
arguments that logically support the 
thesis according to which undistrib-
uted potential dividends do not add 
value to shareholders (and therefore 
must not be included in the definition 
of Cash Flow to Equity). In particu-
lar, they show that the use of poten-
tial dividends for valuation: (a) does 
not comply with the CAPM, (b) does 
not comply with the basic tenet of 
valuation theory, (c) does not comply 
with the no-arbitrage principle.
CAPM. The use of undistributed 
potential dividends is in clear contra-
diction with the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model. When the CAPM is used to 
estimate the cost of equity, ke, one 
uses dividends paid out to calculate 
the historical stock returns and his-
torical beta; one never uses potential 
dividends.
Suppose (i) an investor uses the 
CAPM for computing the cost of equity 
and (ii) uses undistributed potential 
dividends for valuation. Then, the 
firm lies on and above the Security 
Market Line, SML
Assume, with no loss of generality, 
that dLAt+1>0. Due to (i), the following 
relation holds:
             )( fmefe rrrk  B       (13)
10 Admittedly, “potential cash flow” is a linguistic contradiction, because if distribution does not occur, then 
the undistributed potential cash flow is not a cash flow at all, as previously seen.
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with Ft+1 being the expected value of Eqs. (10)-(11) imply dLAt+1 ≠ 0. But 
this contradicts the assumption 
dLAt+1. ≠ 0.
Arbitrage: a counterexample. 
The no-arbitrage principle is a cor-
nerstone in financial theory (Varian, 
1987) and decision theory (Smith and 
Nau, 1995), and, more generally, rep-
resents a norm of rationality in eco-
nomics (Nau and McCardle, 1991). 
We now illustrate a counterexample 
showing that if an investor uses un-
distributed potential dividends for 
valuation, then she is open to arbi-
trage losses. Consider a firm whose 
shares are traded in the market, and 
assume, for the sake of simplicity, that 
one shareholder owns all the shares. 
Suppose potential dividends will be, 
a perpetual 120 if state of nature 1 
occurs, and a perpetual 70 if state of 
nature 2 occurs, but dividends will 
be, in each year, a perpetual 100 in 
state of nature 1 and a perpetual 50 
in state of nature 2 (equal probability 
is assumed). This means that undis-
tributed potential dividends amount 
to a constant 20 with certainty. The 
probability for each state of nature 
is 0,5. Suppose the required rate of 
return to equity is 10%. The inves-
tors who positively evaluate potential 
dividends value the equity firm by 
discounting potential dividends at 
10%: E=0,5(120+70)/0,1=950. 
Now, suppose the ownership offers 
such an investor all the firm’s shares 
at a price of 850. This means that 
the investor will own a firm which 
she values at 950. The NPV to her is 
positive (=100) so she accepts the bar-
1t11 rsshareholde topaidflowCash)1(   ttt EkeEdLA (16)
(14c)
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Eqs. (13) and (14a) tell us that the 
firm lies on the SML, whereas (14b) 
tells us that the firm lies above the 
SML, given that it implies:
   ttfmefe /EdLA)r(rBrk 1
The basic tenet of valuation 
theory. Section 1 has shown that our 
definition of CFE is consistent with 
Miller and Modigliani’s approach to 
valuation. Miller and Modigliani, in 
turn, strictly abide by a basic tenet 
of valuation theory: value depends 
on cash flow received by the inves-
tor. This principle may be formalized 
as:
e
1t
t k
E
E


 
1
Cash Flow paid to shareholders 1t
                             (15)
(see, for example, Miller and Modigli-
ani, 1961, eq. (2)).
By making us of (i) undistributed 
potential dividends for valuation and 
(ii) the basic tenet of valuation theory, 
one incurs contradictions.
Note that one must have dLAt+1  ≠ 0 (if 
not, the use of undistributed potential 
dividends is meaningless). If undis-
tributed potential dividends enters 
valuation, then. Et+1 = ET (1+ke)–CEFt+1.  
But the cash flow paid to shareholder 
is equal to CFE*t+1 – dLAt+1 because 
dLAt+1. are, by assumption, not dis-
tributed to shareholders. Therefore, 
eq. (16) is: 
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gain. Then, the ownership proposes a 
contract according to which the inves-
tor receives 750 and while paying the 
ownership a constant 100 if state of 
nature is 1 and a constant 50 if state 
of nature is 2. To the investor, such 
a cash flow stream is equivalent to 
the cash flow stream distributed by 
a firm which is equal to the firm just 
purchased but with no undistributed 
potential dividends. Therefore, to her 
the value of such a stream is equal 
to value of the firm just purchased 
less the value of the undistributed 
potential dividends. The undistrib-
uted potential dividends are a certain 
amount because she will receive them 
in either state of nature. Hence, the 
discount rate should be the risk free 
rate. Assuming that the risk-free rate 
is 4%, the value of the undistributed 
potential dividends is 20/0,04=500. 
So, the value of the cash flow stream 
is 950–500=450. The investor is then 
required to give up a value of 450 in 
order to get an immediate amount 
equal to 750. The NPV is positive to 
the investor (=300) so she accepts 
again. This strategy results in an 
arbitrage loss for the investor (and an 
arbitrage profit for the arbitrageur) 
(Table 1). 
Hence, if one does not accept the basic 
tenet of valuation theory, one is open 
to arbitrage losses (to avoid arbitrage, 
one needs to value undistributed po-
tential dividends at zero).
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There is empirical evidence that divi-
dends and not liquid assets are what 
increases firm value. Pinkowitz et al. 
(2007) have examined publicly traded 
firms for 35 countries and divided 
the sample between corrupt and non 
corrupt countries and between coun-
tries with good and poor protection to 
minority equity holders according to 
two Investor Protection Indices. Us-
ing our symbols, the model tested by 
Pinkowitz et al is described as:
Vt = α + 1 Earnt + 2 dEarnt  
+ 3 dEarnt+1 + 4 dNAt+1 5 dNAt+1  
+ 6RDt + 7RDt + 8dRDt+1 + 9It  
+ 10dIt + + 11dIt+1 + 12Divt + 13dDivt  
+ 14dDivt+1 + 15dVt+1 + 16dLAt  
+ 17dLAt+1 +εt                               (17)
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where Vt is the market value of the 
firm calculated at fiscal year end 
as the sum of the market value of 
equity and the book values of short-
term debt and long-term debt; NA 
denotes net assets (defined as total 
assets minus liquid assets); Earn is 
earnings before extraordinary items 
plus interest, deferred tax credits, 
and investment tax credits; RD is 
research and development expense; 
I is interest expense; and Div is com-
mon dividends paid. The results by 
Pinkowitz et al. (2007) are shown in 
Table 2.
They allow us to estimate the implicit 
discount rate that makes an extra 
dollar in each of those components 
equal to the amount announced by 
the authors. In Table 3a we assume 
a non growing perpetuity; hence the 
discount rate is 1/PV. The discount 
rate the market applies to one dollar 
in cash is extremely high, while the 
discount rate for the dividends is 
reasonable. Even if we assume that 
the $1 is for ten years (length of the 
study) the order of magnitude for the 
cost of equity ke in the case of cash is 
the same. For dividends, it ranges 
from 0,37% to 21,20%; for cash, it 
ranges from 105,20% to 343,80%.
If one assumes that those coefficients 
are related to one period and not to 
a perpetuity, one obtains the results 
shown in Table 3b. In these cases we 
can see that the implicit discount rate 
for one period has huge differences 
between cash and dividends. We can 
say in general that the market pun-
ishes cash (compared with dividends) 
as seen by the discount rate, which is 
much greater than the discount rate 
for dividends.
In Table 4a some findings are shown, 
assuming a perpetuity: Pinkowitz 
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and Williamson (2002) imply an av-
erage discount rate of 80% (1/1,25); 
according to Pinkowitz et al. (2003), 
one dollar is worth 0,65, so that the 
discount rate would be 153,85%; 
according to Faulkender and Wang 
(2004, p. 23) dollar is worth 0,97 
(discount rate: 103,10%); according 
to Harford (1999), the value of one 
dollar in cash is 0,956 (discount rate: 
104,60%). The discount rates shown 
are very high and unusual and might 
be interpreted as something undesir-
able to the market. In any case, one 
can only infer that dividends create 
much more value than cash, not that 
cash is positively evaluated (results 
for a single period are shown in Table 
4b). 
Furthermore, Table 5 shows that 
dividends are between 20 and 34 
times more relevant than cash in 
value creation in “bad” countries and 
about 4 times more relevant than 
cash in “good” countries.
As the saying goes: whether a glass 
is half full or half empty depends on 
the attitude of the person looking at 
it. Those who see the glass half full 
might say: this is a proof that cash 
creates value and hence should be 
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included in the cash flows. Others 
(and we are in this number) see the 
glass half empty and say: the market 
is adverse to potential dividends be-
cause it discounts them with a huge 
rate, so trying to keep their value 
down to zero. Hence, they should not 
be included as cash flow because this 
is counter to evidence and overstates 
the value of the firm. 
The findings presented in Pinkowitz 
and Williamson (2002) and Pinkowitz 
et al. (2007) just suggest that (changes 
in) liquid assets should not be in-
cluded in the FCF or CFE because 
they inflate the value of the firm. The 
meaning of the above mentioned re-
sults is that one dollar in liquid assets 
creates less than one dollar in value 
and that liquid assets or “potential” 
dividends are something not desir-
able by investors.
Using the aggregate data from 
Pinkowitz et al. (2007) and without 
splitting the sample between good 
and bad countries, one finds that 
one extra dollar of cash is valued at 
zero by the market. This is an aver-
age, and it compares with the above 
mentioned findings. The data from 
Pinkowitz et al., represent evidence of 
this fact. Data cover ten years (1988-
1998) for 35 countries with some 
exceptions such as India, Philippines, 
Turkey and Peru. This means that 
they had near 69.000 observations. 
The values in Table 6 are the mean of 
the medians for each variable for each 
country. Market Value to Book Value 
(V/B) is the sum of market equity 
value plus book value of debt divided 
by book value of assets. Dividends 
and liquid assets are the percent of 
those items in the balance sheet on 
Total assets. The liquid assets are 
not calculated individually but they 
are added (Pinkowitz et al. use the 
term “Cash”). 
Using the aggregated data shown 
in Pinkowitz et al. (2007) we have 
run several regressions between 
V/B, Cash and Dividends. V/B is the 
dependent variable and the other 
two are independent variables. The 
aggregated data we have used are 
shown in Table 6. We depict the 
scattered data for each pair of inde-
pendent and dependent variables: 
in Graph 1 we can observe a trend: 
the higher the dividend, the higher 
the V/B. In Graph 2 the reader can 
observe a slight downward trend: 
the higher the cash level, the lower 
the ratio V/B. Notice that the three 
variables are scaled or normalized 
by book value of total assets. This 
means that one may compare firms 
of different size and from different 
countries and years. 
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We have analyzed eighteen regres-
sion models with the following struc-
ture:
1. Lin Lin model with the following 
structure:
DividendsCashBV ss 210/ BBB
À>«Ê£°ÊÛ`i`ÃÊ>`Ê6É	ÊÀ>Ì
À>«ÊÓ°Ê
>ÃÊ>`Ê6É	ÊÀ>Ì
2. Log Log model with the following 
structure:
)ln()/ln( 210 CashBV s BBB
)ln(Dividendss
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3. Lin Log model with the following 
structure:
in linear form. This means linear 
(Lin Lin) and semi logarithmic (Log 
Lin) models. In particular, the only 
significant variable is Dividends. In 
Table 7 we summarize the statistical 
analysis. We expected to find that the 
relationship between V/B and CFE 
(dividends) be linear, because Miller 
and Modigliani’s valuation model is 
linear (see eq. (16) in section 5). And 
as is suggested by Table 7, the results 
in terms of statistical significance cor-
roborate the linearity between value 
and CFE. In particular, one dollar in 
dividends creates about 8 dollars in 
value (see Graph 1). We are aware 
that this analysis is rather restricted 
because we are dealing with aggre-
gated data and not with the raw data 
Pinkowitz et al. (2007) worked with. 
Another restriction is related to the 
interpretation of the results. Admit-
tedly, we do not have full information 
regarding the specific model used in 
each case of the report. For instance, 
we do not know whether cash refers 
to change in cash or level of cash, or 
if it is located at a different (future) 
period compared with the firm’s mar-
ket value. This is actually critical if 
we are interested in defining the coef-
ficient of the independent variable as 
the increase in value for each extra 
dollar in the variable. 
)ln(/ 210 CashBV s BBB
)ln(Dividendss
4. Lin Lin Log model with the follow-
ing structure:
5. Log Lin Log model with the follow-
ing structure:
)/ln( 210 DividendsBV s BBB
)ln( 43 CashCash ss BB
)ln(Dividendss
We are aware that the model lacks 
good specification because there 
are other variables that have to be 
included, it is based on aggregated 
data and it does not represent the 
true universe studied by Pinkowitz 
et al. (2007). This exploration only 
gives hints and trends.
After the regressions have been run, 
significant models are only those with 
the independent variable Dividends 
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The previous sections have shown 
that change in liquid assets must 
not be included in the notion of CFE. 
However, future research should 
bring corroboration to the idea that 
the market do not positively value 
change in liquid assets. Armed with 
the theoretical toolbox we have de-
veloped in section 1, this last section 
proposes a model for tests, which, we 
expect, will add empirical evidence. 
The model is based on standard 
results of corporate financial theory 
and, in particular, on Modigliani and 
Miller (1963). We use the following 
equation:
             EDVVV TSU      (18)
where V is the value of the levered 
firm, VU is the value of the unlevered 
value, VTS is the value of tax savings, 
D is the market value of debt (as-
sumed to be equal to its book value) 
and E is market value of equity. The 
cash flow paid to the investors is re-
lated to CFE as follows:
 CCFCFDCFETSFCF   (19)
where TS is Tax Savings (or Tax 
Shield), CFD is the Cash Flow to Debt 
and CCF is the Capital Cash Flow 
(Ruback, 2002). From eqs. (18)-(19), 
and using the fact that D is the pres-
ent value of CFD, 
where PV is present value, WACCFCF 
is the Weighted Average Cost of 
Capital for the FCF,  ke is the levered 
cost of equity, D is the market value 
of debt (we assume nominal debt 
equal to market value of debt), and 
WACCFCF is the Weighted Average 
Cost of Capital for the CCF (i.e. pre-
tax WACC). Hence,
            
CCF
t
tt
t WACC
 CCFV
V
1
11
1 



         (21)
Using eqs. (3) and (19) and the re-
lation CFDt+1 = It+1  – dDt+1, eq. (21) 
becomes
 CCF
t
ttttt
t WACC
)dD(dCSI DivV
V
1
11111
1 




                            (22)
where, as seen, the variation in capi-
tal stock dCSt+1 is obtained as differ-
ence between new equity investment 
and shares repurchases occurred 
in the year. If markets positively 
valued changes in liquid assets, 
then the levered value of the firm, as 
empirically evidenced by the market, 
would not be the theoretically correct 
eq. (22), but would be as in equation 
23 (see end of page).
which differs from eq. (22) for the fact 
that change in liquid assets Divpot (t+1) 
are included in the valuation formula. 
We expect to find that in eq. (23) 
Divpot are of no value, or, as a weaker 
thesis, that the value of Divpot is much 
lower than dividends actually paid to 
shareholders.
For the implementation of the test, 
we will need to collect information 
which is usually publicly available:
)at( FCFWACCFCFPVV 
)at( e DkCFEPV 
)at( CCFWACCCCFPV
CCF
t
ttt)pot (ttt
t WACC
)dD(dCSIDiv DivV
V
1
111111
1 



 (23)
(20)
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D Financial debt (book value as a 
proxy of market value)
NS # shares in the market
Pr Market price per share
V Firm value = # shares × Market 
Price + debt (book value) = NS 
× Pr + debt
I Interest payments
CS (cumulated) capital stock con-
tributed by shareholders
Div Dividends paid in cash 
C Cash
STI Short-term investments (mar-
ketable securities)
B Book value of total assets
In order to normalize the data and 
avoid problems of size, currency, 
time, etc., we will divide each vari-
able by the book value of total assets 
in t, in the same way Pinkowitz et 
al. (2007) do. As all variables will be 
divided by book value of total assets, 
the ratio V/B represents Tobin’s Q. 
These independent variables are 
the proxies for components of equa-
tion (23). While Pinkowitz et al. do 
not include payments of debt, we 
will include them, and, tentatively, 
we will not include variables that 
they include, such as R&D expense. 
Hence, our econometric model will be 
(for each firm)
Where all variables are now meant 
to be divided by book value of assets. 
With this model, the value of the firm 
depends on the cash flows the owners 
of equity and debt expect to receive in 
the future and on potential dividends 
as well. Each of the elements of this 
model attempts to capture investors’ 
expectations on future cash flows and 
value. As all variables are divided by 
total assets we have Tobin’s Q as the 
dependent variable, while the inde-
pendent variables will be a percent 
of total assets in t. With this model 
we attempt to measure how much 
value is created for a given value and 
cash flows in the following period. An 
alternate model is
Where a proprietary approach is fol-
lowed, and where Et is measured as 
number of shares times market price 
per share (we will use data from Latin 
American countries). Given that eq. 
(25) requires less information, we 
intend to use the latter when validat-
ing data.
While the two models in eqs. (24)-(25) 
are consistent with standard finance 
theory, we do not intend to claim 
that they are fully explanatory nor 
to make use of them for forecasting 
purposes. The models are meant to 
provide information on the relevance 
of the independent variables, in par-
ticular the relevance/irrelevance of 
Divpot (t+1) to value creation. To this 
end, the various betas are to be inter-
preted as the discount factors for the 
independent variables. In particular,  
β6 is the discount factor for change in 
liquid assets, i.e. it represents the value 
at time t of one dollar of  Divpot (t+1) avail-
able at time t+1. 
Our hypothesis may be phrased in a 
strong or in a soft version:
Strong version: We expect β6 to be sta-
tistically zero (or close to zero). This 
means that investors try to set down 
(24)
ttttt dCSIdDVV BBBB   14131211
ttpott DivDiv EBB   )1(615
tttt DivdCSEE BBB   151411
(25)ttpotDiv EB   )1(6
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the value of Divpot (t+1) by discounting it 
with an infinite or at least at a very 
high discount rate, because they do 
not consider (undistributed) potential 
dividends relevant for valuation. An-
other condition might be that β6  be 
negative and this would mean that 
potential dividends destroy value.
Soft version: We expect Divpot (t+1) to 
be evaluated much less than actual 
dividends. In econometric terms, we 
expect β6  to be much smaller than 
β5.11
If our hypothesis will be corroborated 
(as already implied by both modern 
finance theory and the reported 
empirical findings), the practice of 
assuming that liquid assets are part 
of the cash flows will be (not only 
theoretically but also) empirically 
refuted. 
 #/.#,53)/.3
Economics, and in particular, fi-
nancial economics provide rigorous 
theoretical tools for valuing assets. 
The theory is clear in stating that 
the value of an asset depends on the 
cash flow actually received by inves-
tors, not on the cash flows that could 
be received, unless undistributed 
potential dividends are invested in 
zero-NPV activities and their full 
present value is distributed to share-
holders (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 
2006, Magni, 2007). But if, histori-
cally, the firm has not distributed all 
the available cash, there is no reason 
to assume that in the future it will 
be different. While some authors cor-
rectly recognize that only cash flow 
paid to shareholders should be used 
for equity valuation (DeAngelo and 
DeAngelo, 2007; Fernández, 2002, 
2007; Shrieves and Wachowicz, 2001; 
Tham and Vélez-Pareja, 2004; Vélez-
Pareja, 1999a, 1999b, 2004, 2005a, 
2005b), several authors in applied 
corporate finance and a large part of 
practitioners include use potential 
dividends for computing a firm’s eq-
uity value (e.g. Benninga and Sarig, 
1997; Copeland et al., 1994, 2000; 
Damodaran, 1999, 2006a, 2006b) 
This document aims at showing that 
the practice of adding liquid assets 
to cash flows actually paid is at odds 
with finance theory and seems to 
be inconsistent with empirical find-
ings. Cash Flow to Equity should be 
defined as dividends paid minus net 
capital contributions, i.e. dividends 
plus shares repurchases minus new 
equity investment.
The issue is tackled in the document 
in three ways: economic, logical, and 
empirical. Economically, several 
reasons are given which confirm that 
only actual cash flows are relevant 
in valuation; logically, three formal 
proofs are provided that make use 
of the CAPM, of the basic tenet in 
valuation theory, and of arbitrage 
theory; empirically, recent findings 
in the literature are analyzed (among 
which Pinkowitz et al., 2007) from 
which evidence is drawn that market 
values cash holdings much less than 
dividends paid. An interpretation 
of these findings is that the market 
does not consider potential dividends 
a value driver. 
The main conclusion from this work 
is that practitioners and teachers 
11 See Table 3a and 3b in section 4 and the difference between discount rates.
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should abandon the practice to not 
include liquid assets in the working 
capital when calculating cash flows.
Further empirical work will be done 
with a model that is rigorously de-
ducted from the theory (in particular, 
from Modigliani and Miller’s ap-
proach to valuation). 
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